I have to admit, when I heard the news that Osama Bin Laden was dead, I was shocked. So much so that I didn't believe it, I thought the news anchor said that "Obama is dead". But I wasn't watching Fox News, and sure enough, as surprising as it was, Osama Bin Laden was dead. But with this comes a lot of questions, firstly how does someone so wanted get to hang around in Pakistan for so long, without anyone noticing? This is the man after all, we were all suspecting would be found if anywhere in the same kind of accommodation that Saddam Hussein was found in: a hole and not in a mansion. If there really was a blind eye cast when it came to Osama being in Pakistan by its government, there is no doubt that tensions will be on the rise in US-Pakistan relations. Already, law makers in Washington seem keen to 'check up' on Pakistan, ensure counter-terrorism really is on their mind, and that all the aid the country receives to fight terror isn't being received blind to the actions that would be required of someone remotely a US ally. But is this really how we should go forward in shaping relations with Pakistan? That wasn't the only thought that came to mind for a Post-Bin Laden World. The other striking perception amongst american's [6 in 10] that the death of Bin Laden as a 'death of a leader' means time to reconsider the United State's role in Afghanistan, and troop withdraws, as Susan Page reported in the USA TODAY. Are these two related though in reality, or is this a stream line of Osama as a Hitler type figure, that if you kill, the war machine won't know what to do with itself. I am not blindly for the war in Afghanistan, but I just want everyone to take a deep breath, and think for a moment, is that really how this works, or do we need a reality check?
Lets start with the question of Osama and Afghanistan and Ill move on to talk about Pakistan in due course. Recently, Fareed Zakaria emphasized the point that the take down of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan demonstrates a success of the White House focus on counter-terrorism, over troop movements, and investing the efforts against terror with a lack of dynamic to how Al Qaeda will evolve further. It makes sense to not focus just on Afghanistan, I admit, specially when you consider that there remains large potential for recruitment of new terrorists, not just from nations in the Middle East: The biggest Muslim nation in the world after all is Indonesia in Asia. But beyond that geometry lesson, there is the possibility that Osama's death doesn't actually mean as big of a victory of the United States against terror, as they celebrating in the street outside the Oval Office post Osama's death would suggest. I found an interesting article in Foreign Affairs by Brynjar Lia called "Al Qaeda Without Bin Laden" that was quick to point this out, arguing that Bin Laden wasn't the primary reference point when it came to the ideological and religious thought that encourages Jihad and terror. Even the individuals responsible for spreading such ideological propaganda from Al Qaeda remain largely separate from Bin Laden, another point Lia makes. That is a reality of Al Qaeda, the fuel for terror isn't a single individual, but instead grievances such as western military intervention in the Islamic world, which haven't gone away. This leads me to wonder about this 'hit and run' counter terrorism approach of the White House. To continue to swoop in, and take out an Al Qaeda operative, to leave a gap that gets quickly filled. The reality is too, the more you do just that, the more dynamic Al Qaeda will become. Which leads me to my second point: What to do with Pakistan and their efforts against terrorism?
It seems that Pakistan has much to be frustrated about beyond the United States wanting to extend requirements on future aid to the country in the future. Another article from Foreign Affairs, The Pakistan Dilemma, by Shuja Nawaz suggests just that, with continued U.S. drone attacks in the country, one in march which killed 41, putting the government in an awkward position, with its people deeply angered over C.I.A drone attacks on the one hand, and having the U.S. knock on the door on the other to ask more of their efforts against terror. There remains evidence to suggest that Pakistan, wasn't aware of Bin Laden's location, but not taking the time to probe leaves open that question, and challenges US-Pakistan relations. I understand the idea of secrecy, and how important Bin Laden is, but is Pakistan a client state, or an ally of the United States: swooping in with Navy Seals doesn't exactly leave room to grow ones relationship beyond a simple "do as I say". It also creates further mistrust and cracks in Pakistan, as the military grows ever angrier, creating distance between the civilian government with its hands out for U. S. aid and military in Pakistan concerned about drone attacks, as Nawaz hints on. In my mind, this leaves little room for a co-ordinated effort between the United States and Pakistan against terror. Why not instead want to reach out to Pakistan's military, and allow them to conduct their own efforts against terror, it is after all in their own interests to have a nation with less terror, and sustain peace to enhance their economic development, rather than just remain dependent on U.S. aid. The United States should move to consider this, as a long term strategy, because the reality is, they are not going to win an ally with continued drone attacks, specially if the military is potentially thinking: "we'll we could have caught those operatives, without the risk of civilian deaths". Forgive the metaphor, but Pakistan isn't a prostitute that can be brought off, its a nation with its own dynamic interests, fewer of which are pro-terrorism than this leaving Pakistan to answer questions about Osama Bin Laden in their backyard potentially suggests. Pakistan can be co-operated with.
Fareed Zakaria, as do many other academics, law makers, and policy people, as the time to take actions when it comes to Pakistan and Al Qaeda. But the reality is, firstly, I don't see a necessary connection between Al Qaeda and Afghanistan: keep your eyes on the ball, and be open to a dynamic strategic future, where troops being pulled out of Afghanistan is put on the table in considering whether they need to be there, not which Al Qaeda operative is dead. This kind of proposition heeds not only to the points made above, but the observation that nation-states remain distinct from organizations like Al Qaeda bent on terrorism, a consideration that should be made in the case of Pakistan. As for this counter-terrorism of 'swooping in' and 'getting the bad guy', I really think that we need to grow to consider the dynamic: we don't have a fixed terrorism structure here, we have a dynamic one. There is also the potential that in doing so, you make things worse, rather then better, in the case of Pakistan, but also Al Qaeda - particularly when you loose touch in how the organization will evolve. Fareed Zakaria is a very intelligent academic, but I really worry that all this talk of getting terrorists in this window of opportunity is too trigger happy. Take a deep breath, not to simple give the terrorists room to take one, but instead give room to observe Al Qaeda specially in watching how it moves to fill gaps. For it doing so, one can learn something valuable about Al Qaeda and who to move to make a priority target to undermine the organization further in the future.
Lets start with the question of Osama and Afghanistan and Ill move on to talk about Pakistan in due course. Recently, Fareed Zakaria emphasized the point that the take down of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan demonstrates a success of the White House focus on counter-terrorism, over troop movements, and investing the efforts against terror with a lack of dynamic to how Al Qaeda will evolve further. It makes sense to not focus just on Afghanistan, I admit, specially when you consider that there remains large potential for recruitment of new terrorists, not just from nations in the Middle East: The biggest Muslim nation in the world after all is Indonesia in Asia. But beyond that geometry lesson, there is the possibility that Osama's death doesn't actually mean as big of a victory of the United States against terror, as they celebrating in the street outside the Oval Office post Osama's death would suggest. I found an interesting article in Foreign Affairs by Brynjar Lia called "Al Qaeda Without Bin Laden" that was quick to point this out, arguing that Bin Laden wasn't the primary reference point when it came to the ideological and religious thought that encourages Jihad and terror. Even the individuals responsible for spreading such ideological propaganda from Al Qaeda remain largely separate from Bin Laden, another point Lia makes. That is a reality of Al Qaeda, the fuel for terror isn't a single individual, but instead grievances such as western military intervention in the Islamic world, which haven't gone away. This leads me to wonder about this 'hit and run' counter terrorism approach of the White House. To continue to swoop in, and take out an Al Qaeda operative, to leave a gap that gets quickly filled. The reality is too, the more you do just that, the more dynamic Al Qaeda will become. Which leads me to my second point: What to do with Pakistan and their efforts against terrorism?
It seems that Pakistan has much to be frustrated about beyond the United States wanting to extend requirements on future aid to the country in the future. Another article from Foreign Affairs, The Pakistan Dilemma, by Shuja Nawaz suggests just that, with continued U.S. drone attacks in the country, one in march which killed 41, putting the government in an awkward position, with its people deeply angered over C.I.A drone attacks on the one hand, and having the U.S. knock on the door on the other to ask more of their efforts against terror. There remains evidence to suggest that Pakistan, wasn't aware of Bin Laden's location, but not taking the time to probe leaves open that question, and challenges US-Pakistan relations. I understand the idea of secrecy, and how important Bin Laden is, but is Pakistan a client state, or an ally of the United States: swooping in with Navy Seals doesn't exactly leave room to grow ones relationship beyond a simple "do as I say". It also creates further mistrust and cracks in Pakistan, as the military grows ever angrier, creating distance between the civilian government with its hands out for U. S. aid and military in Pakistan concerned about drone attacks, as Nawaz hints on. In my mind, this leaves little room for a co-ordinated effort between the United States and Pakistan against terror. Why not instead want to reach out to Pakistan's military, and allow them to conduct their own efforts against terror, it is after all in their own interests to have a nation with less terror, and sustain peace to enhance their economic development, rather than just remain dependent on U.S. aid. The United States should move to consider this, as a long term strategy, because the reality is, they are not going to win an ally with continued drone attacks, specially if the military is potentially thinking: "we'll we could have caught those operatives, without the risk of civilian deaths". Forgive the metaphor, but Pakistan isn't a prostitute that can be brought off, its a nation with its own dynamic interests, fewer of which are pro-terrorism than this leaving Pakistan to answer questions about Osama Bin Laden in their backyard potentially suggests. Pakistan can be co-operated with.
Fareed Zakaria, as do many other academics, law makers, and policy people, as the time to take actions when it comes to Pakistan and Al Qaeda. But the reality is, firstly, I don't see a necessary connection between Al Qaeda and Afghanistan: keep your eyes on the ball, and be open to a dynamic strategic future, where troops being pulled out of Afghanistan is put on the table in considering whether they need to be there, not which Al Qaeda operative is dead. This kind of proposition heeds not only to the points made above, but the observation that nation-states remain distinct from organizations like Al Qaeda bent on terrorism, a consideration that should be made in the case of Pakistan. As for this counter-terrorism of 'swooping in' and 'getting the bad guy', I really think that we need to grow to consider the dynamic: we don't have a fixed terrorism structure here, we have a dynamic one. There is also the potential that in doing so, you make things worse, rather then better, in the case of Pakistan, but also Al Qaeda - particularly when you loose touch in how the organization will evolve. Fareed Zakaria is a very intelligent academic, but I really worry that all this talk of getting terrorists in this window of opportunity is too trigger happy. Take a deep breath, not to simple give the terrorists room to take one, but instead give room to observe Al Qaeda specially in watching how it moves to fill gaps. For it doing so, one can learn something valuable about Al Qaeda and who to move to make a priority target to undermine the organization further in the future.
