Beijing: Relations Are What You Make Them

The People's Republic of China is a country that has recently been closely watched, with western nations keen to see China play along and put pressure on nations like Iran and North Korea. Concern continually floats around the fear that China will see itself as 'the exception of the rule' when it comes to dealing with security destabilizing states. But recently China has been more inclined to play ball as Mark Landler and Steven Lee Myers reported in an editorial article for The New York Times. They noted that China was first in line to call out North Korea with the recent test of missile technology with a rocket to launch a satellite into space. And although more recently China has been inclined to oppose sanctions on nations like Iran, recently China came around to enforce sanctions and also play an active role in nuclear talks. This shows that China's concern about regional security is existent even with the demand for oil in China, and it reflects well on relations with the United States where stability on the Korean Peninsula and Middle East is paramount. Mark Landler and Steven Lee Myers left their article with an open question however: Is China's coming around to sanctions based around getting a better price for oil from Iran? Only time will tell. But having read their article, I found myself finding this picture too rosy reflecting on recent deterioration in relations between the Philippines and China over a territory dispute. Is there still plenty to worry about?

According to recent reports, a Philippine Navy plane spotted several foreign vessels in a lagoon at the disputed area of Scarborough prompting the Philippines to send its biggest warship to have a closer look. The fishing boats turned out to be Chinese when the war ship arrived to conduct an inspection, where it was found the vessel contained large amounts of unlawfully collected corals, clams and live sharks. Jason Miks from The Diplomat had the story, reporting that following the incident, Chinese military vessels were dispatched and positioned themselves between the fishing boats and the Filipino BRD Gregorio del Pilar blocking the sailors from accessing the Chinese boats and make arrests. The incident says something about the inclination of the Chinese to move forcefully when incidents around boarder disputes, rather then as Jason Miks goes on to point out, take the high road and have the disputed islands ownership settled in international court and avoid uncertainty and strategic marshaling in the future. The reason for the reaction comes with strong public sentiment in China in favor of seeing such disputes dealt with harshly. China doesn't want its influence in the region to wain to the advantage of other players, but if their interest is to be sustained such a hard line policy can only force harsher responses by Filipino and the Vietnamese - who also hold claims to ownership of the territory - in the future. With a diplomatic solution out of sight, neither side wants to back away strategically, which leaves room for wondering if China is to be a co-operative neighbor or not?

One couldn't fairly talk about the shape of China in terms of relations without talking about Taiwan. The People's Republic of China has had a strong interest in seeing the island not declare independence not just because of how that reflects on the island being a strong democracy increasingly Americanized, but also because China remains interested in not seeing the independence of Taiwan trigger a flow of separatism in the mainland. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser discuss Taiwan from the point of view of the United States in an article for The Washington Quarterly called: 'Should the United States Abandon Taiwan'? They discuss the issue in the opposite regard, suggesting that whilst it might seem an idea to appease China and avoid having to look at the island of Taiwan as a potential spark point, that instead: "Indeed [that] sacrifice might promote new appetites and necessitate fresh efforts...[on China's behalf]". But the arguments being made here is again neo-realist where nations are either forced to use power, or suffer in the hands of those who have it and use it. But this leaves the solution of the 'high road' - as Jason Miks talked about it prior -  intact but unused. My argument here isn't that China is more aggressive then others have portrayed it. I think instead there is plenty of room for relations to follow by choice, rather then be suffered as neo-realists might try and convince us.

China might be inclined to feel a vulnerable power since its rise has been both resent, and accumulated with so much fear from other nations in the world. But the concern will only remain if China makes itself the 'exception of the rule'. China remains strongly dependent on its economy in order to sustain growth. Impoverished groups still exist in China, but as time moves on China is going to see its relations reflect on its trade and its economy. China's ability to continue to conduct its current method of economic bridging to extinguish independence orientated sentiment, like has been the case with Taiwan, will be drained if China looks to strategic methods more and more in the future. The neo-liberal 'high road' of making economic ties reflect on ones relations with other nations is not simply a high road to be flirted with as one among many ways of doing business. The article by Mark Landler and Steven Lee Myers reflects the want to see China in a different light from seen previously. This is clearly the case when one looks to Taiwan. The situation has changed alot reflecting on how former President Bill Clinton marshaled two U.S. battle groups in 1996 after China conducted a missile exercise in the waters surrounding Taiwan ahead of elections there. The need for power has been clearly undermined with continued economic ties reflecting on relations, with the Taiwanese President kind enough to use the phrase 'one nation, two areas' talking about the relationship with China in the recent visit to Beijing. Such observations can only lead China to becoming more inclined towards neo-liberal thinking. Thinking and the behavior which results is not a condition of the nation-state but instead learned, and thus exercised. The hope can only be that this reflects on the prospect of better relations with nations elsewhere.

New Zealand's Little Brother Complex

New Zealand is a small country in the South Pacific Ocean, who's geographical size and population is about the same as that of an average state of the United States. New Zealand has more sheep then people - and a military that is compared with many others, tiny - making it easy to look from the outside and ask: What foreign importance can New Zealnd really have? Analysts from Stratfor a defense and intelligence advisor to top U.S. officials was kind enough to bring such sentiment out from the darkness recently, with the help of Wikileaks of course. Stuff.co.nz had the story, saying that: "When it comes to geopolitical importance," Stratfor analyst Chris Farnham wrote to colleague William Hobart in September last year, "it doesn't get much f---ing lower than New Zealand". I couldn't help reflecting on these comments, hearing that New Zealand Prime Minister John Key was in Seoul for a Nuclear Summit with world leaders. John Key echoed Barack Obama in his speech, with the two men's positions mirrored to the extent they were kind enough to mention each other in their speeches. New Zealand looked like the little brother, following keenly the older sibling in hope of gaining something in return - perhaps a free trade deal? But is that really a symptom of being a small nation like New Zealand is? Is New Zealand a little brother to other nations in the world?

First lets start with as New Zealanders refer to it 'just across the ditch' - translation: over the Tasman Sea - with Australia. New Zealand and Australia are linked by foreign policy in a number of ways that could make the relationship seem to be that of a brothership, but only at first glance. New Zealand and Australia are inclined to mirror each other's strategic interests. New Zealand has its written down in its most recent White Paper that New Zealand would enter a conflict if Australia was attacked. The gesture is returned in the most recent Australian White Paper. New Zealand and Australia have however had a more recent separation in directions when it comes to economic pacts of free trade. When Australia was willing to go with the United States not only to Afghanistan but also Iraq, the United States became inclined to respond with a free trade deal, New Zealand who refused to go to Iraq was not so lucky. But normally the protocol with New Zealand and Australia was that New Zealand would go first, and then Australia would follow when it came to free trade deals. In clear defiance, New Zealand secured a free trade deal with the People's Republic of China - the cross Tasman relationship is yet to take on the same dynamic leaving a seperation in both aspirations and trade deals. As the saying goes, when the Australian economy catches a cold, New Zealand gets the flu, but being that New Zealand is increasingly aware of that as the case - New Zealand is looking beyond Australia more and more. The makes New Zealand less aligned with Australia deal wise beyond Oceania, but also less inclined to see its role as to follow Australia around like a lost little brother.

However, one of the key reasons that New Zealand doesn't look to Australia as a big brother, is that New Zealand already has a free trade deal with Australia. But in saying that that says something about countries that New Zealand doesn't have a free trade deal with. Let me give you an example of what I mean with India. A New Zealand news anchor by the name of Paul Henry made fun of the Indian Delhi Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit on the government television station TVNZ, to the extent that would rather not repeat the remarks here. India was not amused, and within a few days the Indian Minister of Internal Affairs summoned the New Zealand High Commissioner Rupert Holborow. He apologized and made the statement that:“as New Zealand’s High Commissioner to India, I would like to convey my deep regret for the hurt these comments have caused". How much this reflected on existing free trade negotiations between India and New Zealand one can only speculate. However, when New Zealand Prime Minister John Key went to India later on that year, he found the Indian Prime Minister playing hard ball and no free trade. But it's more then that, New Zealand's main export is dairy and meat produce - I have a Chinese friend in Hong Kong who drinks New Zealand milk, it's more expensive she says then other milks, but tastes so much better. Hong Kong seems to exist as a demonstration of what a lack of protectionism looks like: New Zealand milk. But countries like the United States and India are more inclined to want to hold back - they have their own subsidized or noncompetitive farming industries to protect. New Zealand and free trade just doesn't work in many cases, leaving a fiasco to be revealed - particularly when New Zealand considers the dependency it has on free trade, over dealing with its marginal economy at home.

New Zealand currently has a National government focused on fiscal responsibility, which means putting the squeeze on government spending and cutting public sector jobs, as well as services. The sharp reality is that that leaves New Zealand without a plan, and dependent on growth and investment with our trading partners to keep ourselves afloat. A buy of New Zealand farms by Chinese, German and American investors over the last few years are a good demonstration of that. But New Zealand's inclination to look to expanding global markets for their milk and dairy produce are another demonstration - take what has gone on with New Zealand and China since a free trade deal has existed there. A dependency mindset is certainly in existence here, but more then just that - there is a fiasco in the making. If New Zealand hits the brakes and goes into recession - current arguments of fiscal responsibility are going to look like part of the problem, not the solution. That will especially be the case when New Zealanders reflect on tax changes made by their current government. What would likely result? A shake up of internal change, if New Zealand wants growth, it needs to be an innovator - that means new markets and new products - and a focus on investment. For the time being New Zealand has its focus on free trade as its source for growth over investment. There will be less of that in the future with this internal reflection. It might cost New Zealand, but there is always the potentially for it to really pay off. New Zealand for the time being might be a little brother to other countries in the world with the carrot of free trade. But for how much longer? New Zealand cannot sustain its little brother complex with free trade being a wild goose chase.

Making Strategic Thinking Post-Containment

Recently there has been a lot of focus on what to make of strategic thinking as we move into a post-financial crisis world with existing defense challenges. Part of this means the juggling of what to spend more or less on and how to spend on defense to ensure you have your focus in mind. Recently, Jonathan Dowdall wrote an article for publicmic.com which spoke around these points. He suggests there is increasingly a lack of 'strategic logic' with a vocal focus on expanding Washington's commitment to the Asia-Pacific region and putting maritime assets necessary to meet that policy on the "chopping block". The worry in his case is that Washington is saying one thing to the world, but domestic interests are leading to cuts which is ultimately bringing about something else - Dowall doesn't count the deployment of Marines in Australia for much after all. But in him holding that worry, I find myself upon another worry asking what strategic challenges exist currently that warrant a force built more so for a cold war era type confrontation. The big 'hot spots' of the region I would point to as being the Korean Peninsula, and perhaps Taiwan, as well as the Spartan Islands - what are we to expect, focusing on Korea for example. But more then just that, to what extent are the current budget cuts reshaping foreign policy and leading to a post-containment era of thinking.

Let me look firstly to the example of North-South Korean case to show you what I mean. The strategic situation that exists on the Korean Peninsula has been a 'hot spot' brought back into the 'lime light' with the death of Kim Jung IL and the uncertainly of what that means for the future, and the possibility of confrontation. Minxin Pei recently wrote an article for The Diplomat called 'How Kim Death Risks China Crisis' expanding that concern to relations between the United States and China with a worst case scenario playing out on the Korean Peninsula. His fear stems from the fact that a reaction by either the United States or China to a situation - like a crisis post a North Korean collapse or aggressive military action by North Korea - could be seen by the other side as "provocative and ill-intentioned". He goes on to suggest that a crisis in North Korea that involves South Korean efforts to restore order beyond the 38th parallel and the loss of North Korea as a 'buffer state' for China could be a frustrating situation for China which might lead to military action in response. I think however that the focus of North Korea as a 'buffer state' speaks to cold war era type thinking. China might for instance have greater interest in seeing a stable Korean Peninsula without the constant worry of a regime crisis causing a North Korean refugee crisis into China. He also makes this point as though having General MacArthur suggest the war against communism should be extended beyond the Korean border with China happened just yesterday - are tensions really that high? China is far from the 'self conscious' state it was at the time of the Cold War, and its also unlikely to involve itself in a war that could hurt its economic development. I think the United States, South Korea and China could avoid conflict with a multilateral agreement to acknowledge both sides sovereignty, but not before a crisis comes about like Minxin Pei suggests, that would just raise suspicion about intentions. A position like mine talks to post-cold war thinking, but what about post-containment thinking?

Just a few days ago Gareth Evans wrote an article for the Philadelphia Inquirer called: 'Foreign Policy isn't About Good and Evil' which argued along what I would call post-containment thinking. He makes two important points, firstly he warns of the risk of limiting our options as a result of casting those world nations that we don't like as "irredeemably evil" - bringing one ultimately to have to use a gun like the case of Iraq to make ones case. This point with relation to North Korea leads me to Kim Jong-un who some consider as a figure more closely related to Kim Il Sung, likely to use military actions to leverage power against the South for aid and increase his political support amongst those in the military in North Korea as Michael J. Green points out in an article for Foreign Affairs. One can get a very different point of view from reading Cheo Sang-Hun's article for the New York Times where the focus is on North Korea's recent call for implementation of an inter-Korean summit to help see investment between the two nations, something that many in both nations believe could lead to less fragile relations. It could also be the first wave in an eventual opening up China style of North Korea's economy. The aim is not to argue to North Korea's innocence. One could argue that Kim Jong-un is a fresh face with a relatively clean past as Cheo Sang-Hun points out, but that leads me to Gareth Evan's second point in asking: Do countries really always have to be evil? Is there not still the potential for a turn around?

Containment is founded on two pillers, the first directly relates to the threat of 'domination' such as was ideological in the cold war. The secound relates to a notion of putting a country in a cage, and waiting. Hedley Bull made a unique point about world relations saying that countries are able to pursue what he talked of as "purposes beyond ourselves". In doing so, a country is able to behave without any direct payoff in sight. This type of thinking doesn't assume that countries don't always behave with their own interests in mind, but instead that countries can behave without their own interests in mind - in doing so, one leaves a unique opportunity to cooperate selflessly - and change the reputation a country like North Korea might be held to. The concern for the Korean Peninsula in the case of China and the United States isn't about domination, its about greater regional stability that won't be had by the strong invention by either side. But the demise of a policy like containment doesn't rest simply on the changed relations between countries like the United States and China since the end of the cold war. Instead post-containment thinking involves leaving the window for a country to change open. The bigger challenge for the region isn't just seeing the behavior of a state like North Korea beyond a 'black and white' psychopathic mask its often given, but instead giving North Korea an opportunity to behave without wearing that mask to the better of its reputation and be outward engaging. If one is to think along lines like these, one is thinking post-containment.

The Korean Peninsula: The Window to Unification?

Unification for South Korean's is a topic they often don't leave themselves overly concerned with, but recently the topic of unification has been brought to the surface. In September the government of South Korea started a nation wide campaign over radio, television and the internet to promote the benefits of unification, according to Jon Rabiroff at Stars and Stripes. The government of South Korea has also been taking steps to put in place a plan for eventual unification, including considering how to pay for it. According to a report sponsored by the Unification Ministry, the cost of unification if it were to happen in the next ten or twenty years could be between 734 trillion and 2.8 quadrillion won [the numbers are astronomical, even when converted to dollars]. The report has prompted a dicussion of a tax levy to pay for such a huge expense in the future, which might be sent to be ratified by the National Assembly over the next few months according to an article from the Korean HonHap News Agency. However, with all this talk of costs, what do everyday Koreans think about the idea of unification, and the costs and turmoil that might come with it?

Being that I am currently living and working in South Korea, I have the somewhat unique advantage of being able to go to the source on this one, and actually ask everyday Koreans what they think about unification. Most have been friends, who I have brought up the topic gently with. Some of the responses have been interesting however. "I really don't think unification will happen, it will be a slow process if it happens" one of my friends in her early 20s said. " We will have to wait for North Korea to develope economically post a political revolution, otherwise we will face all the burden of paying, which will be huge" she said. "I really feel that North Korean's are completely different people" another one of my friends in her late 20's strongly pointed out, "and a completely different country". "Besides, we were born with the two Koreas side by side, and we cannot see things changing or even imagine it different". I have found it interesting that it seems alot of those in their 20s to mid-30s who seem to have this view, and I am not the only one who has noticed. Andrei Lankov wrote an article in the Asia Times Online which talks about a trend of South Korean's sharing less of their identity with their long lost neighbor to the north. Part of this he suggests comes down to different economic experiences between the two Koreas, but part of it also comes down to the clear divide that exists for those born with North Korea as a seperate place, and in most respects irrelevant. A recent public opinion poll by the Peace Research Institute found a huge increase in South Korea's who see North Korea as a different country, even ethnically. This points to a sharp distinction between older generations who remember Korea as one nation, and see unification as important, and a younger generation whom the idea of unification seems potentially strange, costly and in many respects scary. But all this makes me wonder, what does this mean for the future prospect of unification?

Roland Bleiker in his paper Identity and Security in Korea - which appeared in the Pacific Review back in 2001 - pointed to an interesting problem for future Korean unification. He pointed out that in the sudden collapse of leadership in the north, a resulting refugee and humanitarian crisis might be dealt with by a military from the United States and South Korea "trained to fight and destroy, rather than help and heal". Whilst what he is talking about seems like the manifestations of worst fears, it is certainly interesting to consider how a humanitarian crisis and break down in the north might be treated by South Korea. Whilst the rush of germans over the Berlin Wall at the end of the Cold War was iconic for Germany and the rest of the world, the same kind of event might trigger a different reaction from the South, which would prevent the same kind of open trade of citizens. Imagine for a moment, that there was a break down in North Korea. One cannot be entirely sure the first place North Koreans would go would be South Korea, but what happens in those initial moments might play an important role in whether the two nations come together. The South Korean military holding back refugees from entering South Korea could lead to a frustrated reaction from the people of the north instilling mistrust. Consider for example that North Korean's who have been blocked off from the world for so long, might not have the painful example of German unification to reflect on, and instead strongly favor a quick coming together, which they feel cheated of. Having a growing number of South Koreans who see the North as very different wouldn't help the situation politically either, specially if a reaction of 'they should really sort out their future for themselves' comes in to play. A reaction like this from a generation of South Koreans, it could be said, would kill the idea that Korea can go threw a quick unification similar to that of East and West Germany post the Cold War era. But that isn't the only result I think one can draw from a much newer generation of Koreans with a different way of looking at things.

I think South Korean's are often left unconcerned with any topic involving their neighbor to the north because South Korean's [like everyone else] are more inclined to worry about what they can change - you are driven to madness otherwise. And whilst many in the world might consider living next to a crazy social stuck in the past communist state like North Korea scary, South Korea is a bit like a married couple forced to live next to a dance club - after a while you get use to all the noise, and over the hipe. That being said, I think that one would have to be incredibly stupid if they wanted to claim that South Korea's don't care, particularly when it comes to something like unification, even for a much younger and unique generation of Koreans. Writting this piece on generational change and its effect on the future of both Koreas - or Korea depending on how you are willing to look at it - makes me want to draw not only a different prospect, but hope for the future - rather then the brute stategic stage plan I draw above. For I don't think South Korea's choice is either flight or fight when it comes to a break down in North Korea and the issue of unification. No one can say that unification has become more or less likely, even with the opinion of a younger generation of South Koreans considered. The prospect for a future generation of Koreans deciding their nations belong seperate maybe swiftly changed with experience of this long lost brother nation cast as irralvant. With this experience, Korean's might come to realize how similar and unified they already are, and change their minds about whether they belong together or not. With this considered, time is not running out for unification because of a new generation with a different perspective. The window to unification is not necessarily a fixed one. There remain reasons for unification to take place in many different ways, but my own fear is simply that a strategic debarcle would mean Korean's miss out on the opportunity to come together under less painful circumstances then many fear for Korea's future.

Egypt: A Road to Summer from the Arab Spring

The world currently watches with curiosity and a lot of fear at what is happening within Egypt. With the protests that happened earlier this year ushering in a schizophrenic military regime aimed at sustaining peace in the country and holding back turmoil whilst looking to eventually hold elections. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces has been bent on keeping peace and resenting pressure to hold elections and take into account public liberties, instead cracking down on those within Egypt wanting to criticize the slow pace towards elections. According to Jackson Diehl at The Washington Post, there have been a number of actions by the regime which include bloggers being threatened for criticizing the military council and thousands sentenced to prison by military courts. It seems that individual freedom of speech to a given extent has been challenged, whilst Egypt continues to make steps towards elections planned for November this year. All this leaves me wondering to what extent the illiberal nature to Egypt's pace to democracy might turn Egypt's future as a democracy rotten. But first let me explain, what do I mean when I say 'illiberal'?

Freedoms that are often associated with democracy, have in the past to a given extent been discussed as though they are an inherent attribute of democracy, like suddenly holding elections makes your society liberal. As Fareed Zakaria wrote in an article for Foreign Affairs back in 1997 however, the application of democracy can still leave a country without liberalism, particularly if a countries transition to democracy doesn't bring forward individual freedoms before rather than after elections are first held. As he puts it, the process to pursue freedoms after an election can be tedious, with those in power unwilling to give it up to the people, particularly in a constitution. This kind of logic could translate over to Egypt, with a military regime handing over power to a parliament and/or president whom remains uninterested in acknowledging individual freedoms, like those of free speech and peaceful protest to a full extent, with the want instead to counter economic and civil turmoil in protests. This isn't the only way that elections could hurt civil liberties however. If elections result in a divided parliament where power resides after elections, then the writing of a constitution could become difficult with parties unable to agree on what a constitution should include, leading to a stale mate and again halting progress. All this concern raises a further question: What steps should be taken to keep Egypt on track to a bright democratic and liberal summer, with the acknowledgement of social and civil liberties and elections.

The Egyptian people have plenty to be frustrated with, with Amro Hassan for WORLD NOW noting that protests have again rocked Cairo as people express their frustration with the military. The military has been trying to meet push for shove however, threatening those that protest. However those whom have been protesting, have been demanding social justice and acknowledgement of individual freedoms, as AFP reports. If the current military leadership of Egypt sees threatening the people as a means to sustain the path to democracy, then it would seem that the the Supreme Council of Armed Forces lacks a strong conception of liberalism. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces needs to acknowledge that in light of the current protests, holding elections in November isn't going to magically get everyone off the streets and back to work. The demands of the people are not just for elections. Egypt needs a strong notion of freedoms of the people, and a notion of where power will reside following elections before elections, not to risk a mess either from the whomever gets elected, or from the Egyptian people who will challenge the legitimacy of whomever is elected because of the lack of civil liberties before elections. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces needs to change its behavior and mind set if it wants to get the Egyptian people off the streets.

I think that what Egypt needs right now, isn't a constitution necessarily, but the notion that it has an invisible one, where the current Supreme Council of Armed Forces and whoever comes to power after, understand that the current revolution pends on the idea of freedom, upon many others. Any leadership that ignores freedom is going to find that the revolution won't move from the streets, and will remain, to the pain of any economic and political progress for the country. Therefore, to bring about a summer in Egypt, leadership in Egypt needs to take steps to bind the rights of the people into all actions they take, and set an example for future leadership in Egypt to follow. This should include a notion of what freedoms the people should have that can soon be written into a constitution in the future - when the time is right. Egypt has made so much progress already, even with the current backlash from the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. Egypt now has a much more free press, and a number of different civil groups pinned to the idea of democracy, but also political and economic progress in the country. It needs to utilize this passion, and part of that will come with democracy but part of that also comes with acknowledging the voice of the people, to as full an extent as one can. If any Egyptian leadership wants to avoid a cold dark winter from the Arab Spring in Egypt, they need to embody the change the people of Egypt seek, before an election, as much as after.

Turning the World Green without Kyoto

Turning the world’s businesses towards sustainability and energy efficiency has been posed as one of the great most recent challenges, left untouched. I don’t have to tell you about climate change, I am sure you had already had the pep talk about how climate change is a looming threat, but taking that as an initial premise, where does that leave the world? Recently I have been reading Hot, Flat, and Crowded by Thomas Friedman. Within it, Friedman gives a pitch that climate change and America’s oil dependency calls for actions in the form of legislation, to put America on track. What he suggests, is taxes and fixing a higher price for oil, and charging polluters for the damage they do to the environment. He does so arguing it plays a critical role in fostering demand for American businesses to become energy efficient. This kind of position reeks of a focus on the state to solve the problem, and create the demand for businesses to turn green. As Pierre-Francois Besson puts it in an article for swiss.info, businesses are lost without a new Kyoto Protocol; the business world lacks the signals of demand to gather investment for green and sustainable business. But is all this really fair, and the world needs to work outs the issues that currently prevent the Kyoto Protocol holding weight after 2012, and business is simply waiting around for a new Kyoto and fixing of prices? Or can businesses accumulate the investment needed to get a green tech revolution rolling without Congress or a Kyoto?

It would certainly seem so with companies like Google, and GE entering the market of developing sustainable energy. GE has been filling in the slack, according to Bryan Walsh from TIME Magazine, saying that GE is keen to pick up some of the huge demand in the United States for solar power, and become an expanding player in that market. In doing so, GE has been investing in venture companies with the best ideas on moving solar energy, and sustainable energy from the far future to the present. With businesses keen to cut down on power bills, and save money, the demand for solar panels is astronomical, with Nick Engelfried from GreenAnswers.com reporting that 2011 was a record year for solar in the United States, with a 66% increase in sales. There seems much potential on the horizon for that increase to simply be the tip of the iceberg however. A number of companies like First Solar have been growing on this demand, not just in Germany, but also in the United States. Google is another company making huge investments in sustainable energy, keen to see new and innovative energy generated that is good for the environment, but with a catch; it has to be very cheap so that such a business can be exported to the developing world, like India and China, increasingly the next big polluters. And it’s not simply solar feeling the investment, nor is it just Google and GE, with Ford, and Intel eyeing green tech. According to Jon Swartz from USA today there is little doubt the focus is on new innovation with energy, with 4.9 billion invested in US start-ups, up 40% from the previous year. But all this leads me to my next question: Is this like the great revolutions of the past, like the internet investment bubble, quickly mounting to shrivel when the realization hits that this is the utility to create the revolution, rather than the revolution itself. What do I mean by that?

Thomas Friedman in Hot, Flat and Crowded suggests this in his book, which puzzled me. For someone trying to advocate a revolution in green energy, why would they suggest there is no money to be made? For example when it comes to smart grids, which would allow homes and businesses to make money off power they generate and don’t need and use. Such a grid however will be increasingly important to growing demand for sustainable energy, because if they can sell it, investment in such a grid means money to be made by those keen to grow the sustainable energy market share, and sell solar panels, or sell businesses windmills or green energy machines. There is plenty of money to be made on both sides, and suggesting it’s the next ‘crash and burn’ isn’t just a really bad way of trying to convince a need for investment, but also off the mark: there is plenty of money to be made. When it comes to Thomas Friedman’s argument in favourability of having government or having a Kyoto solve the worlds energy demands, it seems clear these positions have jumped the tracks and are missing the revolution happening right under the nose of all keen to see the world become more green. It’s true that demand is necessary, but with the variously stocks like Google, taking a hit as oil prices increase; companies are increasingly becoming aware that one cannot rely on old sources of energy like oil into the future. Oil prices might go up and down, but it’s a continual roller coaster ride I’m sure many companies will be keen to get off, sooner rather than later. Because the next rise could be a record, and that would mean torture for the share price of many if not any big company flouted. Not only that but the state is not the one who should be looked at to solve the world’s problems, particularly with mounting global state debt, and slow recoveries worldwide. Economic forces are much better in full steam without government clogging the prospect of growth with a new tax, and making its slow legislative process the backbone of the revolution on our doorstep; they are already getting there without a carbon tax. In my view Thomas Friedman is preaching to the converted; the green revolution has already begun.

The Strategic Significance of Aid for the Korean Peninsula

The recent stir up of pro-democracy movements in the Middle East has again brought the world to reflecting on the dictatorships of the world, and wondering about their possibility of the same happening elsewhere, particularly in the case of North Korea. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's hard line polices towards their neighbor to the north differs from the liberal 'Sunshine Policy' taken up by previous presidents. Instead South Korea is holding back aid from North Korea, in the hope of showing North Korea's leadership that there are penalties for violating international law, talking specifically of the sinking of a battleship and the shelling of Yeonpyeong island last year, as Sunny Lee from Asia Times reports. Conservatives in South Korea seem concerned with the continued norm of relations paved by the 'Sunshine Policy' of the past, calling it the lost decade, and instead wanting change. The hope might be to change the behavior of the north towards better relations, with the insistence that an apology appropriate for the attacks in the most recent past. However, with South Korea holding out aid from the north, questions of the strategic significance of food aid come about, and whilst some in South Korea like the hard line taken with North Korea, others are more concerned with the deterioration of relations, particularly with nuclear weapons thrown into the mix. It is clear that North Korea remains dependent on aid, but will this hard line really work and chance relations with the North, or simply force a stand off, as North Korea takes the lack of aid as a challenge?

Whatever the clash, South Korea has vowed to meet it head on, with the military in South Korea having been criticized for its slow response last year. But will tensions really rise, and is the lack of aid from South Korea really a hard line taken by some, but not by others. South Korea hasn't been the only one hastily holding back from giving aid to the north for political reasons, with the United States worried that any aid provided now will end up being distributed during the mass celebrations next year with the marking of the 100 year birth anniversary of the regime's founder Kim IL-Sung, Shaun Tandon at AFP reports. Such aid would be deployed to prop up the North Korean regime, as a number of conservative law makers in the United States worry. However, others call out the aid as humanitarian, and essential for those in North Korea. One such voice being Jimmy Carter, who after his visit to North Korea, called the withholding food for political reasons a 'human rights violation'. However, whatever gap of aid is left by the United States and South Korea, NGOs and the United Nations seem totally willing to fill, undermining whatever political intentions might be had towards North Korea. The United Nations sent food aid to some of North Korea's most vulnerable on humanitarian grounds, and a Christian organization from South Korea sent multiple truck loads of food threw to North Korea, Sunny Lee from Asia Times reports. This might just lead to a change in friends, rather then learned lessons from North Korea. In the end, stability and continued peace on the Korean Peninsula may still be dependent on not what aid North Korea received, but who it received aid from.

The United States isn't the only player South Korea is keen to see play along however, with the big elephant in the room being China, in the hope of enlisting its help to talk some sense into North Korea. Many however are inclined to try and paint relations between North Korea and China as rosy, with Chinese officials keen to make a point of nothing-to-see-here when Kim Jung IL visited China earlier this year. One such scholar keen to paint a rosy picture is Mu Chunshan, who wrote for The Diplomat that with co-ordination between North Korean and Chinese agents, there must be a strong relationship behind it. But I really wonder, if there is a strong relationship, then why all the secrecy with relation to Kim Jung IL's visit. It remains an open question. I remain unconvinced that China's reformist and old-style communist schools within the party are able to come together on what to do with North Korea, and both are playing a part. But in any case I think that the relationship between China and North Korea is not the one to tell of existing tensions, it is instead the relationship between South Korea and China that should be the focus, and act as the thermometer for the region. China has no interest in playing along with South Korea and starving North Korea of aid. In the end, China is trying to consolidate a want to prevent war on the Korean Peninsula and cause swarms of North Korean refugees to head for the Chinese border, and maintain North Korea. In that being the case, it really comes down to perceptions and intentions.

In the end, future stability towards maintained peace on the Korean Peninsula, in any form, is bound not to aid itself, but the intentions that come with the lack of it, particularly in the case of North Korea. If holding back aid from North Korea by South Korea and the United States are aimed with sparking revolution and toppling the leadership of North Korea, future tensions will mount. South Korea should look to the voice of China to determine where such perceptions from North Korea sit, and how desperate the North Korean situations is. South Korea should increasingly consider that if China's voice continues to be more loud, stern and supportive of the North, then perhaps 'Sunshine' might be necessary to avoid tensions sparking a hot war. China may not be the Communist nation it once was, driven by a cold war mentality of maintaining a fellow 'cat' at any cost. But it will respond with its interests in mind, in wanting to prevent a break down in North Korea. If China continues to aid North Korea, as others don't, its voice will be one seen key to North Korea. China will maintain a voice of assurance, but also reformist, as both schools of thought within China play against North Korea. With that as food for thought, perhaps it should be considered that any change from North Korea in terms of behavior will be dependent on the relationship between China and North Korea, more so then how much South Korea can starve North Korea of aid in the future, particularly if South Korea continues to see the strategic significance of aid for North Korea greater then any other force it can exert on its neighbor to the north.